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ABSTRACT  
Several studies find that male individuals are more altruistic toward attractive women, 
suggesting altruism may serve as a courtship display. Many studies exploring this 
phenomenon have used vignettes and facial images. We tested the sexual selection 
hypothesis as an explanation for altruistic behavior, where players played the dictator game 
with “live” participants. Two studies were conducted (Study 1, n à 212; Study 2, n à 188) 
where we manipulated stakes and anonymity between participants to explore the relationship 
between the dictator’s allocations and their perceived attractiveness of the recipient. We 
found no relationship between attractiveness and altruism. Dictators were consistently fair 
when allocating stakes, irrespective of the recipients’ attractiveness. 
  
 




 is defined as behavior that is costly to the 
altruist yet beneficial to the receiver (Trivers, 1971). 
Explaining altruism toward non-kin has been problem-
atic from an evolutionary, and economic perspective, 
often being referred to as an evolutionary puzzle 
(Hamilton, 1963; see Kurzban, Burton-Chellew, & West, 
2015, for a review on the evolution of altruism). Recent 
research has applied sexual selection theory to explain 
the evolution of altruism toward non-kin (e.g., Barclay, 
2010; Farrelly, Lazarus, & Roberts, 2007; Phillips, 
Barnard, Ferguson, & Reader, 2008).  
Sexual selection theory suggests that behavioral traits 
evolve through intra- and intersexual competition. 
Intersexual competition suggests that traits which increase 
our reproductive success are selected by sexual selection, 
commonly referred to as female choice (Workman & 
Reader, 2014). These traits increase one’s attractiveness 
in the mating market, thus providing one with a 
reproductive advantage over others. Sexual selec-tion 
theory posits that the purpose of altruism is to attract 
mates, as altruism is considered a sexually selectable trait, 
evolved to attract the opposite sex (Miller, 2007; Tessman, 
1995). Sexually selectable traits increase our mate value, 
or appeal in the mating market, leading to increased 
reproductive success. As a result, men should display 
altruistic traits more often than women, perhaps because 
they signal a willingness to share resources, signaling 
commitment toward a partner, thus raising one’s value in 




Tessman (1995) argued that men use altruism as a 
mating signal, as it relays a man’s quality as a partner and 
future parent. According to parental investment theory 
(Trivers, 1972), women place a greater impor-tance on a 
man’s ability to gain and share resources than on 
attractiveness alone, whereas men tend to focus on 
physical attractiveness more than women do (Buss, 1989). 
As a result, women should value altruistic traits, especially 
as women invest far more than men into offspring. Mating 
with an altruistic man increases the likelihood that future 
offspring will inherit altruistic tendencies, thus increasing 
the future offspring’s chances of attracting a mate 
(Anderson, 1994). Investing in a man who possesses 
altruistic traits is beneficial in child-rearing, increasing 
survival as well as relationship quality (Kokko, 1998). In 
order to reduce the risk of abandon-ment, and increase the 
likelihood of securing resources for future offspring, it is 
crucial for a woman to choose a mate who possesses 
altruistic tendencies (Trivers, 1971). In support, women 
more than men place a greater emphasis on cooperative 
tendencies (Buss, 1989). Fur-thermore, women prefer to 
date altruistic men compared to nonaltruistic men, 
particularly when seeking long-term partners (e.g., Barclay, 
2010; Farrelly, 2011, 2013; Farrelly, Clemson, & Guthrie, 
2016). Sharing may be seen as a mechanism whereby 
men show off their resources in order to attract a mate, 
increase their reputation, and consequently increasing their 
mate value (Wood & Hill, 2000). Because men also offer a 






























acquisition and sharing (Kaplan & Hill, 1985), men 
should be more altruistic toward women they 
consider attractive. In turn, women should aim to 
secure mates who display altruistic behavior. In 
support, several stu-dies find that men exhibit 
altruism as a courtship display, particularly toward 
attractive women (Goldberg, 1995; Iredale, Van Vugt, 
& Dunbar, 2008; Oda, Shibata, Kiyonari, Takeda, & 
Matsumoto-Oda, 2013; Van Vugt & Iredale, 2013). 
Costly signaling theory has been used to explain 
public displays of altruism, signaling one’s ability to 
confer the benefits associated with altruistic behavior 
(Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Women are sensitive to cues 
that relay both protection of a mate and future offspring 
(Brase, 2006). Altruism is attractive because it signals 
concern for others (Barclay, 2010). Furthermore, recent 
evidence suggests that sexual/dating intention are 
drivers of altruism in men (sexual intention leads to 
higher altruism and cooperation in men; see Bhogal, 
Galbraith, & Manktelow, 2016a). As a result, we should 
expect men to showcase altruism toward attractive 
women in a variety of contexts. 
 
The attractiveness halo effect and altruism 
in game-theoretic frameworks 
 
The attractiveness halo effect is prevalent in several con-
texts, suggesting physically attractive people are evalu-
ated more positively than unattractive people (see Dion, 
Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Langlois et al., 2000; Lorenzo, 
Biesanz, & Human, 2010, see Maestripieri et al., 2016 for a 
review on the influence of physical attractiveness on 
prosocial behavior). Research into dat-ing advertisements 
suggests that men evaluate women with an attractive 
profile picture more positively than women with unattractive 
profile pictures, signifying the power of attractiveness on 
first impressions (Bak, 2010). We are keen to engage with 
attractive members of the opposite sex as they assist in the 
mating process (Maner et al., 2003). We should therefore 
expect people to be more altruistic toward those to whom 
they are attracted. 
 
The sexual selection hypothesis has been used to 
explore the evolution of altruism within a variety of 
economic games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and 
the ultimatum game. Researchers have found that men 
and women are more altruistic and cooperative toward 
physically attractive players (e.g., Andreoni & Petrie, 
2008; Farrelly et al., 2007; Kahn, Hottes, & Davis, 1971; 
Mulford, Orbell, Shatto, & Stockard, 1998; Solnick & 
Schweitzer, 1999; Zaatari, Palestis, & Trivers, 2009). 
Furthermore, offers made by women in ultimatum 
games are accepted more often than offers made by 
men (Eckel & Grossman, 2001). Men behave more 
 
 
altruistically toward, and in the presence of, 
attractive women within a variety of contexts (see 
Eagly & Crowley, 1986, for a meta-analysis; 
Goldberg, 1995; Iredale et al., 2008). 
Many studies investigating the sexual selection 
hypothesis in explaining altruism have involved 
hypothetical scenarios, vignettes, facial images, or 
online simulations (e.g., Barclay, 2010; Bhogal et al., 
2016a; Rosenblat, 2008; Shinada & Yamagishi, 2014; 
Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). An advantage of these 
methods is that they exert control over the extraneous 
factors that influence decision making. However, they 
also limit the physical cues available to participants that 
are avail-able in everyday decision making (Fontelle, 
Phillips, & Lane, 1985). In addition, much of the 
literature involves self-report measures, eliciting socially 
acceptable rather than actual behavior (Baldwin, 1992). 
Little research has investigated the role of physical 
attractiveness in game-theoretical situations where 
participants are playing with real people, having 
additional physical cues available that are not present in 
photographs and online simulations. The research 
reported in this article aimed to investigate the role of 
physical attractiveness in altru-ism when players can 
see an actual participant, aiming to replicate the strong 
effect found in previous literature by altering the 
framework in which these hypotheses can be tested. 
 
Many theorists have adopted behavioral game-theor-
etic models to unpack, and quantify altruism, fairness, 
and cooperation (see Camerer, 2003). The dictator 
game has been used extensively to measure altruism 
toward non-kin in the laboratory (e.g., Heinz, Juranek, & 
Rau, 2012; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996b). Game 
theory has proved useful in explaining how behavior has 
evolved in humans, suggesting economic strategy can 
assist in explaining evolved adaptations (Maynard, 
1982). The dictator game is a simple allocation exercise 
involving a dictator and a recipient. The dictator is given 
an endowment that he or she can distribute with the 
recipient, or not; the dictator determines the proportion 
to be distributed, and the recipient’s role is passive. The 
dictator game offers an extended choice set where 
dicta-tors can choose to keep the whole endowment, 
which is not possible when playing alternative economic 
games such as the ultimatum game (Cappelen, Nielsen, 
Sorensen, Tungodden, & Tyran, 2013). The dictator 
game enables researchers to test simple predictions 
and identify predictors of altruism within a variety of con-
texts and populations (Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 
2007). 
 
The limited literature testing the hypothesis that physi-
cal attractiveness influences altruism in a face-to-face 





























the ultimatum game. The ultimatum game is a two-person 
game involving a proposer and responder. The proposer is 
given an endowment to share with the responder. Once an 
offer is made to the responder, he or she accepts or rejects 
the offer. If the responder rejects, neither participant 
receives any of the stake, making the game strategic in 
nature. As well as a financial cost, there is also a social 
cost to not cooperating in the ultimatum game, as rejecting 
offers reduce one’s chances of being chosen for future 
interactions (Andre & Baumard, 2011). On the other hand, 
the dictator game is a game that measures altruism without 
there being an immediate cost to not being fair. Camerer 
(2003) argued that the dictator game measures altruism 
more directly than the ultimatum game, making it a suitable 
choice to test our hypotheses. Furthermore, fair behavior 
can evolve in the ultimatum game due to repeated 
interactions, whereas reciprocity is not a direct issue in a 
one-round dictator game (Debove, Baumard, & Andre, 
2016). 
 
Saad and Gill (2001) found that physical attractive-
ness had no influence on altruism or cooperation when 
playing a face-to-face ultimatum game. However, men 
offered more of their stake to women. More recently, 
Bhogal, Galbraith, and Manktelow (2016b) investigated 
the role of physical attractiveness in altruism and 
cooperation in a face-to-face ultimatum game. They 
found men and women behaved fairly towards opposite 
sex responders, irrespective of their attraction to the 
recipient. However, decisions made in the ultimatum 
game are driven by strategy, especially as there is a risk 
to not being fair (Eckel & Grossman, 1998). Due to this 
risk, the proposer’s decisions are largely based on 
whether the responder accepts an offer, or not. Bhogal 
et al. (2016b) also found that the majority of responders 
accepted offers made by the proposer. To our knowl-
edge, this article is the first to measure the influence of 
physical attractiveness on altruism when playing a 
dictator game, when dictators can physically see the 
recipient. 
 
From the evidence discussed, we expected dictators 
(across Studies 1 and 2), particularly men, to offer more 
of a given stake to female recipients they considered 
attractive. We were also interested in the relationship 
between self-rated attractiveness and altruism. Shinada 
and Yamagishi (2014) conducted a study in which 
participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game, with 
photographs. They found that the least attractive men 
displayed higher levels of cooperativeness compared to 
those who considered themselves as highly attractive. 
Less attractive men are argued to secure long-term 
reproductive success by gathering resources, more than 
highly attractive men, both adopting different strategies 
when attracting mates (Shinada & Yamagishi, 2014). 
 
 
Several studies have found that self-rated attractiveness 
strongly influences how we behave with others (Hill & 
Reeve, 2004; Montoya, 2008). For example, Stirrat, 
Gumert, and Perrett (2011) investigated the relationship 
between self-rated attractiveness, the attractiveness of 
prospective partners, and paying for meals during mate 
formation. The authors found that men preferred to pay 
for meals with attractive women and that attractive 
women preferred attractive men to pay for their meals. 
In sum, they found that attractive participants were less 
willing to pay for meals compared to the least attractive 
participants. Furthermore, women were more interested 
in engaging with attractive men who paid for their meal, 
suggesting altruism, through resource sharing, may be 
a courtship display. The aforementioned research forms 









Participants and design  
Two hundred twelve participants took part (106 dicta-tors, 
106 recipients; M age à 21, SD à 2.21). Sixty-five percent 
of the sample were single, and 35% were in a relationship. 
In an attempt to reduce the effects of social desirability and 
reputation effects between participants, efforts were made 
to recruit participants who did not know each other. 
Dictators were asked to rate how well they knew the 
recipient with whom they were paired on a 1 (not familiar) 
to 7 (very familiar) Likert scale. The mean score for 
familiarity in Study 1 was 1.3 (SD à .53). To reduce 
reputation management effects between dicta-tors and the 
experimenter, the dictator’s allocations were anonymous. 
We adopted a correlational design where we conducted 
Pearson’s correlation analysis between the dictators’ 
perceived attractiveness of the recipient, self-rated 
attractiveness, and altruism, measured via the number of 
chocolate coins offered to the recipient. 
 
Materials and procedure  
Dictators were paired with different recipients of the 
opposite sex (e.g., male dictator, female recipient and 
vice versa). The study took place in a lab with a one 
way-mirror, which separates two experimental rooms. 
The dictator sat on the side from which he or she could 
see the recipient (through the mirror), and the recipient 
sat on the opposite side of the one-way mirror, where 
he or she could not see the dictator. As a result, 
dictators were able to allocate their stake anonymously. 
Ten chocolate coins were used as the monetary 




























Participants played a one-round dictator game as 
follows: The dictator was given 10 chocolate coins, that 
he or she could distribute with the recipient, or not. To 
ensure that dictators allocated anonymously, we left 
envelopes in the experimental room for the dictator to 
allocate his or her own stake and the recipient’s stake. 
As altruism increases when people know they are being 
observed (e.g., Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002), 
the experimenter was not present in the room while the 
dictator allocated the coins but returned once the 
dictator signaled (by a knock on the door) that he or she 
had completed the game. Note that the dictator was 
aware that the recipient could not see him or her, and 
the recipient was aware that the dictator was of the 
opposite sex. After allocating the chocolate coins, 
dictators completed a questionnaire stating how 
attractive they considered the recipient on a 1 (very 
unattractive) to 7 (very attractive) Likert scale 
(consistent with Bhogal et al., 2016b). The ques-
tionnaire was sealed in an envelope to ensure anon-
ymity. The coins left for the recipient were included in a 





Dictators offered an average of five out of 10 
chocolate coins to the recipient (M à 4.99, SD à 
0.29). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, and 
Table 2 provides correlation coefficients for key 
variables, respectively (data reported by sex).  
A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed 
to assess the relationship between the number of 
chocolate coins offered to the recipient and the 
dictators perceived attractiveness of the recipient. 
There was no correlation between the two 
variables, for both male and female dictators. See 
Figure 1 (male dictators) and Figure 2 (female 
dictators) for a scatterplot outlining the relationship 
between allocations and perceived attractiveness.
3
  
There was no correlation between allocations and the 
dictators self-rated attractiveness. There was a negative, 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics for key variables, by sex (Study 1).  
Variables Sex of dictator M SD n 
Dictators attraction to recipient Male 5.30 1.69 50 
 Female 3.70 1.12 56 
Dictators self-rated attractiveness Male 3.90 1.10 50 
 Female 5.10 1.12 56 
No. of chocolate coins offered Male 5.02 0.32 50 
to the recipient Female 4.97 0.27 56  
 
 
Table 2. Correlations between key variables, by sex (Study 1).  
 1. No. of coins offered 2. Attraction 3. Self-rated 
 to the recipient to recipient attractiveness 
1 — r à ".04 r à .18 
2 r à .18 — r à ".49 
3 r à .19 r à .13 — 
Note. The nonbolded text presents data pertaining to male dictators; 
the bolded text shows data pertaining to female dictators. 
 
 
rated attractiveness and their perceived 





We find that the allocations made by male and female 
dictators were not influenced by the recipient’s physical 
attractiveness or the dictator’s self-rated attractiveness. 
Participants were consistently fair with recipients by 
offering half of the stake. Our finding is inconsistent with 
previous research outlined in the introduction, strongly 
challenging the literature. However, the find-ings are 
consistent with research adopting a similar design to 
ours, using the ultimatum game (e.g., Bhogal et al., 
2016b).  
We attempted to control for social desirability by 
ensuring participants allocated anonymously. However, 
participants behaved fairly, even when they were not 
identifiable. It is possible that this may be due to the 
stake involved and the fact that dictators did not actually 
earn their endowment. Of interest, we find that self-
rated attractiveness does influence how we rate others 
on attractiveness, consistent with the literature, 
particularly among women (Montoya, 2008).  
Traditional economic games involve a stake that is 
freely given to participants without any effort, which is 
rare in the real world (Wright, 1999). Participants may 
see themselves as having more rights over endow-
ments they have actually earned (Baumard, Andre, & 
Sperber, 2013; Cappelen et al., 2013). Dictators’ alloca-
tions may be dependent upon their perception of 
whether they have the right to distribute the monetary 
stake (Hoffman et al., 1994; see List & Cherry, 2008; 
Ruffle, 1998; Wu, Hu, van Dijk, Leliveld, & Zhou, 2012). 
A possible reason for the noneffects found in Study 1 is 
that participants were not “playing” with a resource they 
had actually earned. When we discuss parental 
investment, it is in relation to the investment each sex 
makes toward their offspring. Keeping this point in mind, 
men may make a conscious effort only when deciding to 
distribute their resources, rather than hypothetical 
stakes, which may not hold as much value as actual 
money. As a result, chocolate coins were replaced with 




















Figure 1. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between the number of coins offered by male dictators and their 





Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), adopting a 
quiz-based dictator game, found that those who earned 
their stake through taking part in a quiz distributed far 
more selfishly than those who were simply given their 
endowment. There appears to be a difference between 
equity (reward should correlate with effort) and equality 
(everyone should get an equal stake). Research does 
support the notion of equity in dictator game research, 
where dictators offer more to those they believe deserve 
the endowment (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Heinz et al., 
2012). In addition, Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) 
conducted a study in which dictators and recipients 
earned their endowment by taking part in an exam. 
When dictators were simply given a stake, they offered 
20% to recipients. However, dictators who earned their 
stake kept the whole endowment to themselves. 
Furthermore, when recipients earned their money, 
dictators offered them on average 50% of the stake. 
There is a link between contribution, effort, entitlement, 
 







Participants and design  
One hundred eighty-eight participants took part (94 
dictators, 94 recipients; M age à 19, SD à 0.76). 
Eighty percent were single, and 20% were dating. 
Consistent with Study 1, dictators were asked to rate 
how well they knew the recipient with whom they 
were paired (M familiarity rating à 1.1, SD à .28). 
Study 2 was simi-lar to Study 1, with some changes 
made to the materials and procedure, outlined next. 
 
Materials and procedure  
We altered the design and asked participants to play a 




















Figure 2. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between the number of coins offered by female dictators and their 




























ensure that impression management did not 
influence how many pounds coins the dictator offered 
the recipi-ent. As a result, dictators did not allocate 
the stake in front of the recipient or experimenter. 
Both participants (one man, one woman) completed 
all relevant ethical forms in the same room, as this 
gave the participants an opportunity to observe the 
other participant. They then took part in a quiz, after 
which the recipient was told that he or she did not 
win, and was then debriefed outside the room.  
Once the recipient left the experimental lab, the 
dictator was given £5 (five £1 coins) and envelopes 
to allocate his or her own and the recipient’s stake. 
We used £5 to enforce forced-choice. The 
experimenter then left the room, after which the 
dictator allocated the amount, consistent with Study 
1. The experimenter returned and asked the dictator 
to complete the attract-iveness questionnaire used in 
Study 1 and to place it in one of the sealed 





Dictators offered an average of £3 coins (SD à 0.31) to 
the recipient and kept £2 (SD à 0.21) for themselves. 
We found that when participants were faced with forced 
choice, they behaved altruistically, offering more to the 
recipient than they kept. Table 3 provides descriptive 
statistics, and Table 4 provides correlation coefficients 
for key variables (data reported by sex). 
A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to 
assess the relationship between the number of 
pound coins offered to the recipient and the dictators 
perceived attractiveness of the recipient. Consistent 
with Study 1, there was no correlation between the 
two variables for both male and female dictators. See 
Figure 3 (male dictators) and Figure 4 (female 
dictators) for a scatterplot outlining the relationship 
between allocations and perceived attractiveness. 
Consistent with Study 1, there was a negative, 
medium correlation between the female dictators 
self-rated attractiveness and their perceived attract-




Table 3. Descriptive statistics for key variables, by sex (Study 2).  
Variables Sex of dictator M SD n 
Dictators attraction to recipient Male 5.10 1.80 46 
 Female 3.70 1.13 48 
Dictators self-rated attractiveness Male 3.93 1.64 46 
 Female 4.90 1.85 48 
No. of £1 coins offered to Male 3.00 0.30 46 
the recipient Female 3.00 0.33 48  
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Table 4. Correlations between key variables, by sex.  
 1. No. of 2. Attraction 3. Self-rated 
 coins offered to recipient attractiveness 
1 — r à ".13 r à ".07 
2 r à .04 — r à ".50 
3 r à .09 r à ".02 — 
Note. The nonbolded text presents data pertaining to male dictators; 




We found that when playing modified dictator games, 
there was no relationship between the perceived attract-
iveness of the recipient and the number of coins offered. 
The findings of Study 2 were more surprising than Study 
1, as participants earned the stake they distributed. We 
found that when manipulating stakes and anonymity 
between participants, dictators behaved fairly, and 
altruistically, irrespective of their perceived 
attractiveness of the recipient. In sum, attractiveness 
had no influence on how dictators allocated their stakes. 
Bhogal et al. (2016b) argued that participants behave 
fairly when playing economic games because fairness 
signals equality as opposed to favorability.  
Our findings are inconsistent with previous 
research using facial images and vignettes, where 
participants are more altruistic toward those they find 
attractive. Our research deviated from traditional 
game-theoretic research using facial images and 
hypothetical scenarios. For example, Saad and Gill 
(2001) and Bhogal et al. (2016b) adopted designs 
dissimilar to traditional research within the field, thus 
being unable to replicate the effects of attractiveness 
on altruism found in previous literature. We used the 
dictator game because it is nonstrategic, unlike the 
ultimatum game. We expected the nonstrategic 
nature of the dictator game to elicit similar findings to 
previous literature that sup-ports the sexual selection 
hypothesis in explaining altruism within a game-
theoretic framework. However, we find no support for 
altruism being a courtship display.  
From the studies outlined in this article, men and 
women were not behaving in a manner predicted by sexual 
selection (in relation to altruism) or behavioral game theory 
(maximizing personal payoffs). Instead, men and women 
behaved fairly, uninfluenced by their own or their perceived 
attractiveness of the recipient. Our findings, coupled with 
the limited literature (e.g., Bhogal et al., 2016b; Saad & Gill, 
2001), strongly chal-lenge the assumptions and the 
findings of the literature suggesting altruism is a courtship 
display evolved to attract the opposite sex. Typically, even 
when attractive-ness has no influence on altruism, men 
have been found to be more altruistic toward women (e.g., 





















Figure 3. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between the number of coins offered by male dictators and their 





our results could be quite damaging to the presumptions 
of evolutionary theorists exploring the influence of 
physical attractiveness on altruism in economic games, 
using the framework of sexual selection theory.  
We provide clear evidence that altruism is in no way 
influenced by physical attractiveness when players are 
engaging with “live” participants. A strength of our stu-
dies relates to the design. The dictator game offers 
researchers a paradigm under which we can isolate and 
measure individual predictors of altruistic behavior 
(Bechler, Green, & Myerson, 2015).  
However, one of the major disadvantages of observing 
altruistic behavior in the lab relates to external validity 
(Winking & Mizer, 2013). Researchers argue that the issue 
relates to participants behaving as though they are being 
observed, due to the experimental framework 
 
of research utilizing economic games, such as the 
presence of researchers and anonymity (Fessler, 2009; 
Haley & Fessler, 2005; Winking & Mizer, 2013). 
However, we did aim to control for such variables by 
ensuring anonymity between participants and the 
dictator/experimenter. However, human beings have 
evolved mechanisms whereby we see social exchanges 
as potential long-term relationships, particularly as our 
ancestors lived in close proximate groups, where anon-
ymity was not always possible (Cosmides & Tooby, 
2005), which may also explain the prevalence of 
fairness across both studies, especially as participants 
were engaging with “live” participants. 
We set out to investigate whether physical attractive-
ness influenced altruism in modified dictator games. 





















Figure 4. Scatterplot depicting the relationship between the number of coins offered by female dictators and their 




























not influence altruistic behavior, even though there is a 
beauty premium for which attractive people are thought to 
be “better” than unattractive individuals and have been 
found to be offered more in economic games com-pared to 
unattractive people. It is rather difficult to investigate 
whether the fair behavior observed in both studies is a 
reflection of reputation management or the strategic nature 
of economic games (Eckel & Grossman, 1998). 
Furthermore, Nettle et al. (2013) argued that economic 
games involving low stakes yield a high pro-portion of 
participants sharing their stake, which could be a potential 
explanation for our findings. Perhaps future research needs 
to be conducted where dictators are given, or have the 
chance to earn larger stakes. 
 
Fairness appeared to be a powerful driver of how part-
icipants allocated their stake. It appears that being both 
selfish and altruistic is not seen as a normative behavior, 
which may be why participants were consistently fair. 
People appear to have a need to appear to be fair and 
equal (Benabou & Tirole, 2006). Fairness implies impar-
tiality (Baumard, Andre, & Sperber, 2013), which appears 
to be driven by prosocial norms (Skyrms, 2014). A reason 
why participants were fair may be because they were 
adhering to social norms of fairness, especially as people 
rely on fairness norms when bargaining in economic 
games (Skyrms & Zollman, 2010). According to Skyrms 
(2014), we are acculturated into incorporating fairness into 
our everyday decision making. 
 
Young (2015) suggested that social norms drive 
behavior that signals morality. Social norms help to resolve 
collective conflict, and Young suggested that the 50/50 
division is a social norm because it is a prominent solution 
in everyday situations. Furthermore, Young suggested that 
norms signal intention, and one’s moral character, which 
can be beneficial at a reputational level. Therefore, fairness 
is a social norm, as it signals equality. Fairness norms may 
therefore moderate altruistic or coop-erative behavior 
(Debove et al., 2016; Yamamoto & Taki-moto, 2012). This 
battle between behaving fairly, selfishly, or altruistically 
may be influenced by the fact that altruism can often leave 
the altruist with a lower payoff than the recipient, whereas 
fairness equalizes social exchange. 
 
According to Mercier and Sperber (2011), evolution may 
have selected cognitive mechanisms that force us to 
adhere to norms that increase our fitness. Fairness is 
social norm, especially as fairness links to cooperation, 
social exchange, and reciprocity. Inequality aversion refers 
to when people are willing to receive lower or higher 
payoffs to achieve equitable outcomes (Montero, 2007). 
Being unfair is not seen to be equitable, whether it relates 
to disadvantageous or advantageous inequality aversion 
(see Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Participants in Studies 1 to 2 
appeared to value equality, motivated by 
 
 
the avoidance of disutility. People are motivated by fair, 
equal outcomes and are willing to receive a lower payoff 
in order to promote equality (Dawes, McTavish, & 
Shaklee, 1977). As a result, inequality aversion can be 
avoided by adopting fairness norms (Yamamoto & 
Takimoto, 2012). Research suggests that people prefer 
equal outcomes (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). In support, 
Skyrms (2014) argued that fairness (50/50 distribution) 
is an evolutionarily stable strategy, which may be why 
previous research, including our results, has found that 
people generally distribute stakes fairly when playing 
economic games. 
 
According to Nowak, Page, & Sigmund (2000), repu-
tation is fundamental to the evolution of fairness norms. 
Fairness evolves in economic games, because there is 
much to gain through reciprocal fairness. Chiang (2008) 
also applied reputation models to explain the evolution 
of fairness. He argued that a preference for fairness is 
built on the fact that benefits accumulated through 
fairness, if large enough, should evolve in a given 
population. Andre and Baumard (2011), adopting a 
partner choice framework and a reputation-based 
model, found that when people had the opportunity to 
choose partners in an economic game, they chose 
those who adhere to fairness norms.  
Our research has some notable limitations. First, the 
resources varied between each study. People might have 
behaved differently if the stakes were larger and if these 
stakes had higher monetary value. Although the rationale 
for changing the stakes was that participants may view 
money as having more value than chocolate, we found that 
this was not the case. Perhaps future research could 
increase the stakes available. Second, we limited the 
framework to a dictator game. Perhaps future research 
could investigate whether physical attractiveness influ-
ences altruism in trust and public goods games. Although 
researchers have argued that maintaining anonymity is 
important in reducing reputation management effects (e.g., 
Franzen & Pointner, 2012), this article provides evi-dence 
that increasing anonymity between participants, and 
between experimenter/dictator, has no influence on 
altruistic behavior, thus strongly challenging previous 
research in the field. As Winking and Mizer (2013) stated, 
“Despite assurances of anonymity, participants must still 
somehow record their decision with the knowledge that it 
will be reviewed and analysed” (p. 289). Therefore, the 
impact of reputation management and social desirability 
may have still been present even when the dictator was not 
face-to-face with the recipient. Some may argue that 
manipulating stakes was a limitation. However, previous 
research suggests that when comparing offers in studies 
using genuine, or replica money, offers tend to be similar 





























regardless of initial levies on stakes (Hoffman, 
McCabe, & Smith, 1996a).  
Traditional game theory suggests that decision 
making is purely rational; we make decisions that 
increase our personal payoffs. If that were the case, 
participants should have offered less to others when 
given the chance to do so. However, there is some 
contention that players see economic games as moral 
dilemmas, as opposed to economic transactions, thus 
leading players to behave moralistically as opposed to 
maximizing personal profit (see Baumard, 2016). This 
may be why attractiveness had no influence on altruism 
in the framework we adopted.  
In sum, the studies reported in this article do not 
provide support for the sexual selection hypothesis as 
an explanation for the evolution of altruism, particularly 
when participants play economic games where they can 
see the other participant, in person. Instead, we find that 
fairness, or fairness norms, appear to drive people’s 
decision making when playing economic games. Further 
testing is needed to explore the relationship between 
altruism and physical attractiveness in a wider variety of 
contexts; however, this article strongly challenges the 




1. Terms such as altruism, fairness, and generosity are 
used loosely and interchangeably within the field. We 
follow the guidelines of West et al. (2011) and Debove 
et al. (2016) by using the terms more stringently. In 
game-theoretic terms, we define altruism as offering 
more to a recipient than one keeps. We refer to fairness 
when parti-cipants distribute a stake equally by offering 
half an endowment to another participant (50/50 split).  
2. Both studies were approved by the research ethics 
commit-tee at the University of Wolverhampton. All 
participants across Studies 1 and 2 were recruited 
from the University of Wolverhampton. Note that it 
was a prerequisite that participants who took part in 
Study 1 were not permitted to take part in Study 2.  
3. We believe, consistent with Valentine, Aloe, and Lau 
(2015), that graphical displays of data provide the 
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